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Directors’ pay and corporate governance continue to generate public outrage and calls for 
reform. Our meta-regression analysis of all comparable UK pay-for-performance estimates 
finds little, if any, meaningful association between directors’ pay and corporate performance.  
However, there is evidence of the effectiveness of past ‘comply-or-explain’ rules, especially 
the Cadbury Report.  Unfortunately, the effects of past reform efforts tend to erode over time. 
The paper also explores differences between pay-performance estimates, finding that these 
are largely explained by how pay and performance are measured by a given study.   
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“… the case for statutory rules is weak and so the Cadbury approach of trying to 
educate and persuade companies to make changes in corporate governance is 
probably the best one. …There already exist mechanisms that help to ensure that 
companies are well managed – such as the takeover mechanism. There is no reason to 
think that Cadbury is a substitute for these mechanisms”.  
 Hart (1995, p. 688) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Pay  for  performance  contracts are  essential  to motivate executives  to achieve 
organizational goals.
1
There are three broad policy approaches to governance: (1) rely solely on markets to 
determine contracts; (2) develop prescriptive rules and self-regulation such as ‘comply or 
explain’; and (3) impose government rules and regulation. In practice, governments adopt  
some combination of these.  If the market for corporate control is an effective governance 
mechanism and if the hiring and firing of CEOs is efficient, then restrictive prescriptions and 
regulations can be counterproductive, reducing social welfare (Hart, 1995).   However, 
political and institutional pressure for reform has been fueled by the recognition that markets 
  Hence, they are of paramount importance to shareholders.  
Furthermore, executive pay is often of great concern to policy makers,  in general,  and 
regulators, in particular.   Periodically, the public takes an active interest in the remuneration 
of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).  High levels of CEO pay are controversial, and the 
public seems poised to demand action. Indeed, scrutiny over CEO and directors’ pay and 
governance issues has increased globally, especially since the collapse of several large 
corporations; for example, Enron and Worldcom in the US (Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2006).  
The 2007 global financial crisis has only intensified this interest (Kirkpatrick, 2009).    2 
do not always deliver effective governance; thus,  a  no intervention  approach  seems 
insufficient to protect shareholders’ interests.
2
Commencing with the Cadbury Report (1992), the UK has led the world through 
‘comply or explain’ codes of practice.
  
3  A steady stream of reports on governance has 
contributed to the evolution of the comply-or-explain regime: the Cadbury Code (1992); the 
Greenbury Report (1995); the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (1998); and the 
revised Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003).  As a result of these reforms, UK 
corporate remuneration committees are required to include  independent non-executive 
directors who are expected to align directors’ pay with firm performance.  These codes of 
best practice have been followed by legislative change. In particular, the Directors’ 
Remuneration Regulations (2002) and the Companies Act 2006 mandate that shareholders 
vote on directors’ pay at annual general meetings.
4  The 2009 review of the Combined Code 
advocates further reform to: “emphasise the need for performance-related pay to be aligned 
with the long-term interest of the company …” (FRC 2009a, p. 3).
5
       In spite of considerable reforms, there remain questions of whether in the UK 
directors’ pay is related at all to their firms’ performance and whether the reforms have been 
successful in realigning directors’ interests with shareholders. While many commentators and 
the public in general often resort to visceral opinions, good policy is informed by evidence.  
Given the intense interest, it is natural that a substantial and growing academic empirical 
literature has emerged on the links between directors’ compensation and the performance of 
corporate entities.  However, the assessment of what the available evidence can tell us is 
usually based on judgment rather than an objective summary of research (see Stanley 2001).  
Empirical results are often not consistent across studies, and studies differ in a number of 
important dimensions: employing different measures of remuneration and performance, using 
    3 
different data and using alternative model specifications. These incommensurable differences 
make it very difficult to draw robust inferences using conventional qualitative reviews.  
The diversity of empirical results, the importance of the topic  and the continued 
efforts toward  performance-based compensation provide  our motivation to study 
comprehensively the extant empirical findings on the association between pay and 
performance in the UK. This study does not offer new estimates of the pay-performance 
association; rather, we draw new empirical inferences from the large extant research base, 
using meta-regression analysis (MRA). Applications of MRA in economics have been 
growing steadily (Stanley 2001).  Examples include: Görg and Strobl (2001) on the spillover 
effects of multinational companies, Mookerjee (2006) on exports and growth, Disdier and 
Head (2008) on the effect of distance on bilateral trade, and Bellavance, Dionne and Lebeau 
(2009) on the value of a statistical life, to cite but a few.  By putting the extant evidence 
through the microscope of MRA, it is indeed possible to draw several robust inferences 
concerning pay for performance in UK executive contracts.
6
This paper applies MRA to the results from 44 empirical studies to answer four key 
issues regarding the marginal return to directors’ effort.  First, we explore the efficiency of 
contracts by testing whether executive remuneration is a function of corporate performance. 
Second, sufficient time has now passed and enough evidence has been reported from which 
to assess the effects of governance reform.  Hence, we examine the research record for traces 
of the impact of self-regulation on pay for performance.  Third, studies differ widely in their 
findings; thus, we employ MRA to identify the principal sources of heterogeneity amongst 
hundreds of  reported  pay-performance  estimates.  Finally, we explore whether the  pay-
performance association varies by firm size. 
  
Existing studies rarely test directly the effectiveness of governance reform on pay for 
performance. They do, however, contribute important information towards such an   4 
assessment.
7
While a sufficiently large scale single study can be used to investigate the impact of 
government reforms, it is well know that even a large study will rarely resolve theoretical 
issues.  Moreover, such a large study has yet to be carried out, mainly because of data issues.  
Our approach is to draw inferences from the available pool of studies.  The advantage of 
meta-analysis is that it increases statistical power (Cohn and Becker, 2003) and it enables us 
to understand why studies differ in the results they report.  
  The strength of MRA is that it is able to reassess the research record and 
explore dimensions of between study  variation that often could  not  be  considered by 
individual empirical studies.  By analyzing the research record across time and controlling for 
difference in research design, we can quantify the effects of reform.   
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the theory behind pay-
for-performance.  Section 3 describes recent code of practice and rule  changes in UK 
corporate governance.  Section 4 discusses the meta-regression methodology and the reported 
research results that define this study’s data.  MRA data are all of the empirical studies that 
report estimates of the pay-performance relationship. Section 5 presents and interprets the 
MRA results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Theoretical Foundations 
Our primary aim in this paper is to provide a quantitative review of the extant 
empirical evidence of the CEO pay-performance link. The relevant theory has been 
extensively covered elsewhere.  Here, we present only a very brief sketch.
8
Efficient remuneration contracts motivate CEOs and directors to focus on both the 
short- and long-term value of the company. These contracts should be transparent, reward 
success, punish failure, and discourage excessive risk taking. Boards operating with good 
governance and well-functioning remuneration committees are more likely to act in the best 
      5 
interests of shareholders. Executives have incentives to divert corporate resources for their 
own private benefits but their ability to do so is limited by legal systems that protect the 
rights of shareholders (see Leutz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003).  In the absence of good 
corporate governance and strong shareholder protection, there is the risk that executives will 
maximize their own personal benefit potentially at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003).  
The goal of reward schemes in remuneration contracts is to motivate managers to 
maximize the company’s performance and shareholders’ wealth. If this is the case, there 
should be a positive association between executive pay and corporate performance. However, 
in practice, weak governance may result in little or no actual  link between pay and 
performance. In addition, other factors such as experience also influence executive 
remuneration  and there are also internal and external factors  that influence corporate 
performance. These include institutional rules and regulations, firm size, ownership structure, 
corporate governance attributes and, of course, macroeconomic and market conditions that 
affect all firms or all firms in the same industry. To address the inherent complexity, it is 
necessary to separate the various factors that influence pay and performance. Consequently, 
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where ln denotes the natural logarithm, W is executive pay, y is company performance, x is a 
vector of other variables that affect pay (such as market conditions, firm size, characteristics 
of the executive such as age and tenure, relative performance evaluations, and corporate 




 If firms design optimal contracts, then βy should be statistically and practically 
greater than zero.  
3.  Governance in the UK  
 Concerns about executive pay in the wake of scandals such as Polly Peck, BCCI and 
Maxwell Communications led to a series of reports that advocated greater transparency in 
contracts. The ‘Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Committee’ led by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury published the report which was later known as the Cadbury Report (1992). This 
report outlined a number of recommendations to strengthen corporate governance, for 
example, the separation of the role of the CEO  and chairman,  the  composition of non-
executive directors on the board, transparency of financial reporting and the need for good 
internal controls. In particular, the Cadbury Report  recommended  that boards appoint 
remuneration committees consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors and chaired 
by a non-executive director.  
 The Cadbury Report was followed by the Greenbury Report (1995) that strengthened 
the establishment of remuneration committees that are accountable directly to shareholders. 
The remuneration committee is expected to be comprised exclusively of non-executive 
directors with no personal financial interest in the company, as well as no direct involvement 
in the company’s management. The Hampel Committee was established to review the 
implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports. The resulting Hampel Report (1998) 
made further recommendations on the structure and operations of the board and directors’ 
remuneration and accountability. The Hampel Report led to the publication of the Combined 
Code of Corporate Governance (1998) to consolidate these reforms and recommendations.
11  
After the 2009 review of the Combined Code, further changes were advocated to align 
directors’ pay with the long-term interest of a company (FRC 2009a). The purpose of all of   7 
these reforms is to strengthen the pay-for-performance link.
12
In contrast to a more legislative approach (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US) that 
imposes a set of rules that apply to all companies, the emphasis in the UK has been on codes 
of practice that enable firms to tailor governance according to their circumstance, thereby 
balancing the needs of shareholders with managerial autonomy. While the Code is voluntary, 
firms are expected to comply. The London Stock Exchange requires all listed companies to 
report in their Annual Report their compliance with the Code. The Code has received wide 
institutional support but there has always been the threat of legislation if industry does not 
self-regulate. Indeed, there remain calls from some institutions to tighten regulation rather 
than rely on self-regulation (FRC 2009b, July).  
 Evidence indicates that these 
codes have increased board oversight (Conyon, 1994; Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002).  
But, do they actually strengthen the pay-for-performance link? 
Bruno and Faur-Grimaudy (2009) find that more than half of the FTSE350 firms were 
fully compliant with the Combined Code by 2004. Deloitte’s (2004) review of the impact of 
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations shows that most companies comply with the 
regulations, though many fail to communicate effectively:    there is excess shareholder 
demand for communication, especially with regard to directors’ bonuses.  
 
 
4.   Meta-regression analysis 
The motivation behind meta-regression analysis (MRA) is the idea that a single study 
is unlikely to provide a definitive answer to a research question and that authoritative 
inference needs to be drawn from the results of all empirical research on a given topic 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). By combining the results from numerous studies, meta-analysis 
results in more precise estimates of an effect than the individual studies themselves   8 
(Kulinskaya, Morgenthaler and Staudte, 2008).  Indeed, sampling error causes empirical 
results to appear to vary more widely than they really are. Sampling error is easier to detect 
and quantify within a pool of studies, than within a single study. Furthermore, MRA can 
explain systematic heterogeneity of empirical findings, thereby quantifying and explaining 
the variation in results within studies and between studies.  Because this is all accomplished 
by objective statistical methods,  MRA serves as a quantitative and  ‘scientific’ literature 
review (Stanley, 2001).   
  
4.1  The meta-analysis of the pay-performance link 
For this application, MRA involves regressing comparable estimates of the partial 
correlations between pay and performance, against a constant and a vector (Z) of data, 




ij ij 1 0 ij u Z r + + = β β             (2) 
 
rij  is the i
th pay-performance partial correlation reported in the j
th study and uij  are the random 
errors. Equation 2 assumes that the dependent variable varies randomly around a central 
effect, β0, and that this effect is moderated by the variables in the Z vector.
14 A test of H0: β0 
= 0 is thus a test for whether the literature has established that pay is linked to performance. 
Efficient contracts require that β0 > 0.
15
  While simple, equation 2 is an effective way of integrating the often diverse findings 
from numerous studies and to control for the effects of random error. We use equation 2 to 
test whether the pay-performance partial correlation (r) is positive and to quantify how it 
varies between studies.  Equation 2 is a multivariate MRA that enables us to also explore the 
 The size of β0 informs shareholders and regulators 
about the strength of the pay-performance association.    9 
effects of moderator variables on the estimated size of the pay-performance effect. That is, 
equation 2 is used to identify the variables that cause heterogeneity in the published 
estimates. This is detected when we find statistically significant coefficients associated with 
the Z vector of variables. For example, equation 2 can be used to identify whether the pay-
performance effect is reported to have changed over time, whether there are differences 
between total compensation and bonus compensation, and whether there are differences 
between accounting and market-based measures of firm performance.  These and other 
potential effects on the pay-performance association are investigated below. 
 
4.2  The research base and the data used by this meta-regression analysis  
A comprehensive literature search was conducted, using numerous search engines, as 
well as references cited in research papers, books, and working papers.
16 Five search criteria 
for inclusion in the MRA were adopted. First, the study had to use some measure of CEO pay 
or the remuneration of the entire board of directors as the dependent variable.  Included are 
studies relating to total, cash, or base salary compensation, options, or bonus payments. We 
excluded studies that analyzed a pool of senior (non-director) executives, without offering 
estimates specifically for the CEO or for all board directors. Second, we are interested in the 
partial effect of performance on pay, after controlling for other factors that are likely to 
influence pay (equation 1). Hence, studies that reported only simple correlations between pay 
and performance were excluded. Third, the study had to be published, so that working papers 
are excluded. The inclusion of working papers is a controversial issue in meta-analysis, and 
we have preferred to side with caution in this analysis. Working papers might represent 
estimates that are still not finalized. They are also studies that have not yet gone through the 
refereeing process and, hence, might be of lower quality. The main consequence of this 
criterion is that we are excluding newer studies. However given that we still have over 500   10 
reported estimates, our MRA is not unduly constrained by its sample size.  Fourth, studies 
had to report sufficient information from which a comparable effect size could be calculated. 
This means that studies, which do not report significance levels or t-values and sample sizes, 
could not be included in the meta-analysis. Fifth, only research published in English and in 
academic journals is used.
17 These search criteria identify 44 studies that report a total of 511 
estimates of the pay-performance association.
18 The studies are listed in Appendix 1.
19
The included studies comprise our population of available studies defined by the 
above criteria. We are confident that the studies included in this meta-analysis are 
representative. We cannot use reported regression coefficients, because they are not directly 
comparable across studies.
  
20 Instead, we use the associated partial correlations.  The partial 
correlation is a measure of correlation between pay and performance, controlling for all other 
effects on pay. Ideally, we need a measure of the pound increase in CEO pay associated with 
a 1% improvement in performance. This measure, however, is not available for many studies. 
Because we desire a comprehensive assessment of the empirical literature, we opt to use 
partial correlations to maximize our coverage of the extant research.
21
The meta-data are presented in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 is a simple bar graph that 
shows that two-thirds of the reported pay-performance associations show no practical link, 
according to the guidelines set by Cohen (1988).
  A statistically 
significant positive partial correlation indicates that CEO pay is positively associated with 
performance. The magnitude of the partial correlation further informs on the strength of the 
association. For a smaller number of estimates, we are able to calculate elasticities and semi-
elasticities and refer to these below. 
22  Figure 2 is in the form of a funnel plot, 
showing the distribution of these  estimates, with precision (the inverse of the estimate’s 
standard error) on the vertical axis.  Note that with a couple of exceptions the more precise   11 
(higher) estimates tend to have a small pay-performance correlation.  Precise estimates are 
the most reliable and informative. 
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Figure 3 shows the same data points in chronological order.  This graph reveals a 
declining trend of reported pay-performance partial correlations, falling by -0.002 per year 
(t=-2.79; p<.05).  This trend becomes clearer and much stronger (-0.004) after other relevant 
determinants of reported pay-performance correlations are included our below multivariate 
MRA.  This apparent weakening of incentives is discussed further below. 
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4.3  Potential limitations to systematic reviews 
Before presenting our MRA results, we discuss some often encountered issues in 
meta-analysis and systematic reviews.   
 
Study quality 
We have tried to be as inclusive as possible in our choice of studies used in the MRA. 
Studies differ in a number of respects raising the issue of whether differences in the quality of 
studies might affect statistical inference. Our approach to this potential issue is to construct   13 
weighted averages, by assigning greater weight to estimates from studies that are deemed to 
be of higher quality. Statistically, optimal weights are given by each estimate’s precision 
squared; precision is the inverse of that estimate’s standard error (Cooper and Hedges, 1994). 
More precise estimates are assigned a larger weight, because these values are more reliable 
and informative.  Typically, this means that smaller studies are given less weight, as they tend 





Many of the 511  estimates result from using different econometric specifications 
and/or different measures of the dependent variable. Our meta-data are rich and enable a 
detailed exploration of heterogeneity between and within empirical studies. The one 
disadvantage, however, is that not all the estimates will be statistically independent of one 
another, which suggests that OLS might not be an appropriate estimator. While some studies 
report a single estimate, on average, studies report about eight estimates each. Hence, data 
dependence among estimates from the same study is a potential problem when calculating 
MRA’s standard errors. Our approach to handling this is to use clustered data analysis in all 





Many economists have been concerned with the representativeness of publicly 
available empirical estimates, fearing that authors tend to submit, and journals tend to accept, 
statistically significant findings or those findings that are in accord with economic theory. 
(Delong and Lang,  1992).  Indeed, most empirical investigations into the selectivity of 
economics research detect its presence (see, for example, Görg and Strobl, 2001; Roberts and 
Stanley, 2005; Mookerjee, 2006). On the other hand, some literatures have been found to be 
relatively free of it (e.g. Disdier and Head, 2008; Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2009). We have   14 
reason to believe that this will not be an issue in  the pay-performance literature. 
Doucouliagos and Stanley (2008) show that where a literature is vigorously contested with 
regard to the direction of some empirical effect, then selection bias will be minimal.  In any 
case, it is always prudent to test formally for the existence of such selection bias and to 
accommodate its potential presence (Stanley, 2008; Stanley, Jarrell and Doucouliagos, 2010).  




  This MRA test result is further confirmed by noticing that there is little 
asymmetry in the funnel graph, Figure 2 (see also Stanley et al., 2010).  
Other restrictions 
Most studies do not identify the exact firms included in their samples. Hence, it is not 
possible to identify the degree to which the same observations are included in different 
studies. As a result, there may be some unknown data dependence across studies. This issue 
is likely to affect only efficiency, not bias, and the way the standard errors are best calculated.  
Moreover, the industry composition is unknown in most cases. Hence, we are unable to 
control specifically for industrial differences in the pay-performance link.  
Another limitation is that if there have been measurement or reporting errors in the 
original studies, these will be carried over into the meta-analysis. However, such errors will 
likely be ‘random’ and thereby be properly absorbed by the MRA’s error term.  
Finally, we are obviously reliant upon the estimates reported by studies. The vast 
majority of studies report only the average response of pay to performance. With the 
exception of studies such as Conyon and and Schwalbach (2000), relatively little is known 
about the distribution of pay-performance effects between firms. It should be noted, however, 
that all of these issues apply to all reviews, including traditional qualitative (or narrative) 
reviews. 
   15 
5.  Meta-Regression Analysis Results 
By subjecting the research record to rigorous statistical analysis, we can now address the four 
research questions posed in the introduction. 
 
5.1   Is pay driven by performance? How large is the effect? 
The average pay-performance partial correlation for all 511 estimates combined is 
+0.080, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This average is calculated using the 
square of each estimate’s precision as the weight, so that more precise estimates are given a 
greater weight.
26
Most prior reviews of this evidence have reached a similar conclusion that there is a 
positive pay-performance effect; however, meta-analysis enables us to quantify the size of 
this effect. A partial correlation of +0.08 is considered to be a trivial effect of no practical 
consequence, according to the guidelines set by Cohen (1988).  For a subset of this research, 
we are able to calculate elasticities (n = 187). The weighted average of these elasticities is 
+0.01,  which is not statistically significant nor  of any economic consequence. We also 
identify 217 semi-elasticities. The weighted average semi-elasticity is +0.0003, which again 
is not statistically different from zero. Although all measures are consistently positive, we 
find no practically relevant  pay-performance link when the  entire  research record is 
considered.  This finding supports those who advocate further corporate governance reform.  
  When all studies and all estimates are considered, our meta-analysis 
confirms that CEO pay is positively correlated with performance. However, the 
representativeness of this average assumes that there is no important publication selection or 
heterogeneity.  Although there is no evidence of publication selection bias, there is clear 
evidence of systematic heterogeneity, which is discussed in detail below.   
   16 
5.2.   The impact of governance reform and the sources of heterogeneity  
 What factors might explain the wide differences in the reported pay-performance 
effect within and between studies?  Here our aim is to explore the heterogeneity among 
reported estimates with special attention on whether the strength of the pay-performance link 
has changed over time and on the effects of governance reform.  Does the comply-or-explain 
regime affect the pay-performance link? 
Table 1 presents the multivariate MRA regressions based on equation 2. Our aim here 
is to explain why the reported pay-performance  estimates differ. All columns report the 
results of using weighted least squares, with precision (1/SE, the inverse of standard error) 
used as the weights.
27 Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for each covariate. 
Column 2 reports our base model consisting of four moderator variables. AverageYear is the 
average year of the data used to estimate equation 1. Figure 3  suggests that there is an 
important time dimension to the estimates, and AverageYear  is included to capture any 
changes in reported effects over time. Cadbury is a binary variable taking the value of 1 for 
the period after the Cadbury Report  (1992 onwards) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
CombinedCode  is a binary variable taking the value of 1 for the period after the first 
Combined Code (1998) and 0 otherwise. The comply-or-explain regime was designed to 
strengthen the pay-performance effect and, hence, we include both of these two variables to 
capture these governance reform efforts. Both the Cadbury Report and the Combined Code 
represent important junctions in the development of corporate governance in the UK.
28
EcoFree is the average value of economic freedom associated with the data used to 
estimate pay-performance, as measured by the Fraser Institute.  This notion of economic 
freedom assesses the overall degree to which markets are regulated in the UK.
 If 
reform were successful, then we should find a positive coefficient on at least one of these 
variables.   
29 According to   17 
La Porta et al. (1998), greater reliance on market forces should increase shareholder influence 
and, hence, achieve stronger pay-performance links. Hence, we expect EcoFree to have a 
positive effect on the pay-performance link. That is, the more market orientated an economy 
is, the greater the reliance on markets to monitor and reward executives and address agency 
issues. A potential limitation for some of our MRA results, below, is that the inclusion of 
EcoFree  may wash out the effects of comply-or-explain reforms because both deal with 
markets, regulations and voluntary contracts.  In fact, the multiple correlation among these 
variables is greater than 0.7.   
To this base model, column 3 adds six variables that capture differences in the way 
that the dependent variable is measured. Cash is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
estimate relates to cash compensation (salary plus bonus). Likewise, Salary relates to salary 
compensation only, Bonus to bonus pay, Option to options-based remuneration, Changepay 
to the change in compensation (rather than levels), and Directpay relates to the pay of all 
board directors.   The omitted category is the level of CEO total compensation.  
Column 4 adds six  variables that capture differences in the measurement of 
performance. Returns is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the estimate relates to a 
market-based measure of performance, ROE=1 if a study uses return on equity, Sales = 1 if 
sales is employed as a performance measure (typically return on sales), and Other = 1 if any 
other accounting-based measure of performance (such as the level of profit and earnings per 
share) is used. For all of these performance variables, the base is return on assets (ROA). 
Lagperform is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the estimate relates to a lagged 
measure of performance, rather than a contemporaneous one. Relative is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the estimate is based on a relative measure of performance; that is, the 
performance of a firm relative to others in the industry.   18 
Column 5 adds variables that capture differences in data, specification and estimation. 
Data differences are explored through Panel, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
estimate uses panel data, where cross-sectional data is the base. Specification differences are 
explored through six variables. Firm Size explores differences between studies that control 
for firm size and those that do not. Pay is expected to be a function of firm size (Tosi et al. 
2000); therefore, the inclusion of firm size in the primary regression might affect the size of 
the estimated pay-performance effect. Age, Tenure and Education explore whether there are 
differences between studies that control for the CEO’s age, tenure with firm and education 
level and those that do not. The use of a lagged dependent variable is captured by Lagpay, 
which to some degree accounts for model dynamics in the pay-performance relation.  Finally, 
Growth is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the estimate controls for a firm’s growth 
opportunities. We also include three variables to capture estimation differences. NonOLS 
denotes studies that estimate the pay-performance association using estimators other than 
OLS. FirmEffect and TimeEffect are binary variables for whether firm specific fixed effects 
and time period fixed effects were included in the estimation. 
In Column 6, we add four variables that capture aspects of corporate governance. 
Ownership  denotes CEO stock ownership; Boardsize  denotes the size of the board; 
Composition denotes board composition, controlling for the presence of either outside or non-
executive  directors; and Duality  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the study 
controls for CEO board duality (where the CEO acts as Chairman or vice versa the Chairman 
acts as CEO).
30
Column 6 reports the general model with all potentially moderating variables 
included. The MRA model reported in column 7 is derived by following a general-to-specific 
modeling strategy, sequentially eliminating statistically insignificant variables (p-values 
greater than 10%).
 
31  The main reason for adopting a general-to-specific modeling strategy is   19 
to remove redundant or insignificant variables and, hence, to improve the clarity in which we 
can see the remaining variables.  This modeling strategy is standard in meta-analysis. 
Because we have 31 potential explanatory variables, it is important to eliminate variables that 
are not statistically significant from the MRA so that we identify the individual trees from 
this forest.   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results, we rerun the MRA under different 
scenarios. For example, we considered only estimates for CEOs, removing estimates relating 
to the entire board of directors. We separately removed any estimate using sales growth or 
sales/profit ratio as the performance measure. We removed the smallest and largest 5% of 
estimates. We also rerun the MRA treating each observation equally. The key results remain 
unaffected by these variations. These robustness checks are available from the authors. 
Overall, the MRA estimates do an excellent job of explaining heterogeneity across the 
research literature. Our MRA explains around 80% of the variation in partial correlations (see 
columns 4 to 7, Table 1).  
 
Time Variation  
The negative coefficient on AverageYear confirms the time series pattern seen in the 
data (Figure 3) even after controlling for many other factors that affect this pay-performance 
relation.  The magnitude of pay-performance link has been weakening over time (by 0.04 per 
decade, on average). This is consistent with rising managerial power and weakening board 
control over pay determination, enabling opportunistic directors to extract higher rents. 
The most likely explanation for this trend is the relatively lax regulation of bonuses 
and options. The pay-performance association will fall over time  if bonuses and options   20 
become a greater part of remuneration in a lenient regulatory environment.  Poor disclosure 
requirements make it difficult to assess the relative weight of bonuses and options over time, 
particularly prior to 1992.  However, there is some evidence that the relative importance of 
bonuses and options has been rising, while the regulation of bonuses in the UK remains 
relatively weak (Bruce, et al. 2005). 
  A second explanation might be that there is a link between pay and firm size and this 
link might have grown stronger over time, for example, due to mergers and acquisitions, 
particularly during the 1990s. Directors might justify their rising pay more in terms of firm 
size and less so in terms of performance, so that over time size becomes relatively more 
important than performance.  
32 The data show that firm size has been rising over time. For 
those studies that reported average firm size, we regress the average value of the natural 
logarithm of firm assets on the average year. This generates a positive time trend (+0.17, t-
statistic = 1.92, n = 121).  In order to explore the links between pay and firm size, we 
calculated 266 partial correlations between firm size and pay from these same studies. The 
MRA of this data reveals no trend in the pay-size association.
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Another explanation might be that this trend is an outcome of improved reporting 
standards over time, making it harder for managers to manipulate recorded profits. If the 
ability to manipulate profit reports is declining over time, then it might appear as if the pay-
performance effect has been declining. In earlier years, if profit figures were more easily 
exaggerated, it would also be easier to peg higher pay to exaggerated performance. Over 
time, however, it has become more difficult to manipulate earnings, so that the  pay-
performance relation would then appear to weaken. 
  A constant pay-size 
association and an increase in the size of listed companies indicate that size is becoming 
relatively more important in pay increases.    21 
These findings are consistent with a climate of dynamic contracting.  As directors’ 
relative power rises, their pay becomes less and less linked to their firm’s performance.  Enter 
pressure from professional organizations and regulators, and we have an ongoing dynamic 
tension between directors, shareholders, institutions and regulators. Due to agency problems, 
company directors have an incentive to lessen the control that shareholders have to influence 
their pay. But periodically, new regulations, accounting standards or guidelines will come 
along to hold directors more accountable.  As a consequence, we can get periodic shifts up in 
this pay-performance connection.  Nonetheless, opportunistic CEOs and directors might then 
redouble their efforts to exploit weaknesses and loopholes, causing a gradual erosion of the 
association between pay and performance over time. 
 
Regulatory Reform 
Since the Cadbury Report  and the Combined Code, disclosure has increased and 
companies are reporting more information on compensation contracts. The effect of these 
improvements has been to increase the pay-performance effect, as seen by the statistically 
significant  positive coefficient  for the  Cadbury  dummy variable.  In order to test the 
robustness of this finding, we considered alternative ways to measure reform.  Table 2 reports 
the results of several robustness tests, using alternative measures of reform embedded along 
with the other variables of the general-to-specific model of column 7, Table 1.  For ease of 
comparison, column 1 reproduces the coefficient for Cadbury from column 7 of Table 1. 
 In column 2, Cadbury is replaced by % Non-Exec, which is the percentage of non-
executives on the board.
34  In column 3, reform is measured by %Separation, the proportion 
of boards that separate the Chair and CEO.  Once again, we constructed this variable by 
collecting estimates reported by several authors.
35  Column 4 includes Cadbury and replaces 
CombinedCode with % Compliance, the percentage of firms that are fully compliant with the   22 
Combined Code.
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In contrast to Cadbury  and CombinedCode, these alternative reform measures are 
continuous. However, they capture only part of the reform process. In the absence of a 
comprehensive and continuous measure of overall reform, we prefer the binary measures of 
reform. In spite of this numerical richness, none of these alternative measures of reform are 
statistically significant. It is only the two Cadbury Report related variables, Cadbury and 
%Post-Cadbury, that are robustly statistically significant. As already noted, Cadbury and 
EcoFree are somewhat collinear, and EcoFree’s multicollinearity becomes extremely high 
when all of the other variables in column 7 of Table 1 are considered.  In column 6 of Table 
2, we replace Cadbury with EcoFree and find that EcoFree, nonetheless, has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient.
  Finally, in column 5, we replace Cadbury and CombinedCode with % 
PostCad and % Post CombinedCode, which are the percentage of observations in the post-




TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As a final robustness check, we separated the studies into those using only pre-reform 
(pre-1992) data and those using only  post-reform data. There are 15 studies with 148 
estimates derived from data that do not include the reform years. The average pay-
performance effect from these is +0.05, less than the +0.08 when all data is used. There are 
also 17 studies with 198 estimates that do not include data prior to the reform years. The 
average pay-performance effect from these is +0.09, slightly higher than when all data is 
used, and significantly higher than when only the pre-reform data are used.  
Taken together, all of these findings indicate that the voluntary code of practice 
regime did have some small positive effect on pay-for-performance. However the effect is   23 
quite small, adding only about +0.04 to the average partial correlation. Moreover, according 
to the MRA coefficient on AverageYear, a decade is sufficient to eliminate the gains made by 
observed corporate reform efforts. Hence, in contrast to Hart’s (1995) observations that the 
Cadbury report was probably the best way to proceed, MRA of the accumulated evidence 
suggests that the voluntary code has not managed to strengthen incentives sufficiently over 
the long run. 
 
Measures of pay and performance 
The base in the MRA is total compensation. When compensation is measured as cash 
(salary plus bonus), the partial correlations are significantly lower (-0.08  on average). 
Similarly, when compensation is measured in change form, rather than in levels, pay for 
performance is lower.  
The measurement of performance appears to be a particularly important determinant 
of within and between study differences in estimates. The base in the MRA is return on assets 
(ROA). The coefficient on Returns indicates that pay for performance is greater when a 
market-based measure (typically shareholder  returns)  is used to measure performance. 
Market-based measures of performance are seen to be a forward looking measure and are 
thought to reflect the market value of the company in the long-run. In contrast, ROA is an 
accounting-based measure of performance and essentially is backward looking: ROA 
provides an accounting measure of past profits, whereas Returns  provides an economic 
measure of expected profits. The coefficient on Returns is in line with our expectations; that 
is, pay for performance is greater for market-based measures. 
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When performance is measured in terms of sales, the pay-performance effect is larger, 
implying  that pay-performance is more likely to be linked to sales-based measures of 
performance.
  
39 The use of sales to measure performance is controversial, as it might also   24 
measure the size of the firm
40
A smaller pay-performance effect emerges when performance is measured with lags. 
In other words, the pay-performance association is larger when considered as a 
contemporaneous association. Most estimates use the current year’s performance, although 
26% use lagged performance. The MRA shows that including a lagged measure of 
performance reduces the magnitude  of the reported pay-performance correlation.  While 
endogeneity is a potential issue, estimates that are exclusively focused on options and 
bonuses, or which include these components of pay, will need to look at contemporaneous 
performance and this result in larger pay-performance effects.   
, or the growth potential of the firm. Nevertheless, 16% of the 
estimates have used it as a measure of performance and this leads to higher pay-performance 
effects.  The coefficient on Sales  may be viewed as a measure of the effect of poor 
performance measurement. 
 
Specification and estimation differences 
  No differences among estimators emerge from this MRA.  However, there is some 
evidence that controlling for the director’s education level reduces the size of the correlation 
by a rather large amount. What might be seen to be a reward for performance might, in part, 
be a reward for human capital.  This finding implies that CEO education is positively related 
to both pay and corporate performance.   
  The inclusion of pay dynamics (Lagpay) increase pay-performance effects. This 
variable is picking up both the effects of specification and estimation. There is convincing 
evidence that there are lags in the administration of pay (see, for example, Boschen and 
Smith, 1995; Main et al., 1996). Hence, a well specified remuneration model should include 
lagged pay. The coefficient on Lagpay thus can be seen as a measure of the magnitude of 
misspecification when lagged pay is not included. At the same time, estimates with lagged   25 
pay were predominately derived using the GMM estimator (though some are provided using 
OLS). Hence, Lagpay also captures the effect of different estimators and the net effects of 
unobserved variables.  The coefficient on Firm effects suggests that omitting firm specific 
fixed effects does not result in biased estimates of pay and performance, once other aspects of 
studies are controlled for. To a large extent, this might be picked up by Lagpay.
41 However, 
the specification of equation 1 in change form is often adopted as a way to get rid of firm 
specific fixed effects, and the MRA results shows that this produces smaller pay-performance 
effects. There is some evidence that the inclusion of time effects produces slightly lower 
estimates of pay for performance.  Taken together, the coefficients on Lagpay  and  Time 
effects imply that estimates of pay for performance that do not control for lagged pay and 
time effects will, on average, report partial correlations that are 0.04 lower.
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Board composition is an important moderator in the pay-performance association: 
Studies that fail to control for board composition overestimate the pay-performance effect. 
However, once measurement and data differences are considered, the inclusion of other 
corporate governance variables (e.g. board size) in a primary regression does not seem to 




  These findings are not 
surprising considering that board composition is one of the areas on which reforms focus.  
5.3  Effects of size 
  In a competitive labour market, firm-specific characteristics should not be important 
for compensation. However, empirical studies have found that compensation varies 
depending on characteristics of the firm (see, for example, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 
1999).  Unfortunately, research in this area rarely explores  the effects of firm-specific 
characteristics on the magnitude of pay for performance.
44    26 
One dimension of between firm differences relates to the effects of the size of the firm 
on pay for performance. Does the marginal return to effort vary according to the size of the 
firm? Several papers have argued that the pay-performance effect is moderated by the size of 
the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Schaefer (1998) found that size also influences the 
compensation performance sensitivity, incentives are higher for smaller firms. Unfortunately, 
studies do not always report the average size of the firms in the sample used. We are able to 
match pay-performance correlations with only 93 estimates of the size of the firm in terms of 
total assets employed and 342 estimates of the size of the firm in terms of sales turnover. 
Ignoring other covariates, a simple MRA between the pay-performance correlation and firm 
size reveals a negative effect when assets are used to measure firm size, and no effect when 
sales are used to measure firm size.
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 Adding the natural logarithm of the average value of 
sales as a measure firm size to our MRA produces a coefficient of -0.005, with a t-statistic of 
-1.70 (for the general-to-specific specification, column 7 of Table 1), suggesting an inverse 
link between firm size and the size of the pay-performance effect, once other aspects of 
research are considered. Unfortunately, this inference is drawn from a significant reduction in 
the  number of observations, from 518 to 342, and the level of significance is weak.  
Nonetheless, this is also consistent with the notion  that the pay-for-performance link is 
eroding over time due to the increase size of listed firms.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
The pay-performance association is of great importance.  It lies at the heart of shareholder 
and public interests.  Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been published, often 
reporting quite diverse  and conflicting results.    The difficult challenge for scholars and 
regulators  is  to draw sound  and  robust inferences from this large and growing  research 
record.  Has governance reform worked? The business press remains skeptical  (Mawson,   27 
2009; Stevenson 2009), while the academic literature has produced a wide range of often 
conflicting results.  
In this paper, we apply meta-regression analysis to 44 empirical studies that combined 
report 511 estimates of the pay-performance relation among UK corporations.  Our meta-
regression  analysis draws  several  robust inferences from this research.  Overall,  this 
quantitative assessment of the research record finds little connection of CEO pay to corporate 
performance, when performance is measured  as either ROA or shareholder returns.  
However, this link is moderated by several factors, not the least of which is the self- and 
mandated regulatory climate. The Cadbury Report and subsequent reforms appear to have 
strengthened the relation between CEO remuneration and shareholder returns. The effect of 
governance reform, however, has been relatively small. Reform had the effect of increasing a 
practically insignificant pay-performance effect to, at best, a small effect.  Moreover, our 
MRA also reveals a robust declining time trend in the strength of this pay-for-performance 
link. This declining trend means that the small positive effect arising from reform vanished 
within a decade. This loss of effectiveness of reform could be driven by opportunistic CEOs 
seeking  to  weaken  their  shareholders’  influence  over  their pay.  Periodically,  as  new 
examples of corporate abuse comes to light, increased scrutiny leads to new codes and/or 
regulations, which, in turn, force directors to become more accountable, at least for a while. 
But incentives for CEOs and directors to reduce shareholder oversight remain.  Over time, 
CEOs  will  discover  weaknesses and loopholes  in the new codes, gradually  eroding  the 
association between pay and performance. Potentially, the cycle repeats whenever effective 
new rules or regulations are adopted.   
Our meta-regression analysis uncovers that there is much systematic variation among 
reported research results.   In addition to a time trend and the comply-or-explain code reforms 
discussed above, this variation can be explained by: alternative ways pay and corporate   28 
performance are measured, pay-performance dynamics, and the use (or omission) of human 
capital variables.  Lags in both pay and performance also affect reported results.  Pay seems 
to be more closely tied to current and forward-looking measures of performance, while pay 
has its own inertia.   
Alternative measures of pay and performance also have substantial practical effects 
on this link.  Using more market-based measures of corporate performance also substantially 
fortifies this link.  When sales growth is used as a measure corporate performance, pay-for-
performance correlations are further increased.  However, this might reflect the importance of 
corporate size, rather than  corporate  performance,  in determining CEO compensation.  
Together, these factors explain over three-fourths of the observed variation found in the 
research record.     
The choice between comply-or-explain  codes and legislation partly depends on 
whether investors or regulators are better at corporate governance and influencing salary 
contracts. Our MRA shows that the pay-performance link in the UK has been falling, 
indicating that market pressures are insufficient alone to address principal-agency problems 
and  to protect shareholder interests. Although the MRA shows that institutional and 
regulatory pressure has bolstered  the link between remuneration and performance, the 
observed association remains weak.  Many shareholders still feel that the link between pay 
and performance is not clear or sufficiently strong (Deloitte 2004). Executive salaries will  
continue to grow, giving rise to new calls for heightened public scrutiny.  On the one hand, an 
argument can be made that additional reform is needed in the UK to strengthen shareholder 
interests. On the other, it can be argued that ultimately it is up to shareholders to monitor and 
protect their own interests.  
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Table 1: Determinants of Heterogeneity in UK Pay for Performance Contracts 
(Dependent variable = partial correlations between directors’ pay and firm performance) 
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ROE  0.014 
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Other  0.198 





(0.70)  - 
Lagperform  0.256 








Relative  0.065 





(-0.91)  - 
Panel  0.564 






Firm Size  0.618 
(0.486)  -  -  -  -0.010  
(-0.45) 
0.001 
(0.02)  - 
Age  0.086 
(0.281)  -  -  -  0.093  
(0.77) 
0.087 
(0.75)  - 
Tenure  0.054 
(0.225  -  -  -  -0.028 
(-0.41) 
-0.090  
(-1.26)  - 
Education  0.021 
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Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics using clustered data analysis to correct standard 
errors for within study data dependence. All estimates are with weighted least squares, with precision used as 
weights. Bold coefficients are statistical significant at the 5% level. Wald-all reports the p-value for a Wald test 
for the joint significance of all variables included in the MRA. Wald-joint reports the p-value for a Wald test for 
the joint significant of the Cadbury and CombinedCode. The Adjusted R
2 relates to the OLS equivalent. 
 
 
Lagpay  0.161 






Growth  0.390 
(0.488)  -  -  -  -0.023  
(-1.31) 
-0.017  
(-0.92)  - 
Non-OLS  0.123 
(0.329)  -  -  -  0.014  
(0.25) 
0.019  
(0.35)  - 
Firm effects  0.188 
(0.391)  -  -  -  -0.030 
(-1.01) 
-0.048 
(-1.44)  - 
Time effects  0.478 






Ownership  0.094 
(0.292)  -  -  -  -  -0.087  
(-1.51)  - 
Boardsize  0.102 
(0.302)  -  -  -  -  0.012 
(0.38)  - 
Composition  0.153 




Duality  0.150 
(0.358)  -  -  -  -  0.001 
(0.06)  - 
Concentration  0.083 
(0.275)  -  -  -  -  0.006 
(0.25)  - 
Adjusted R
2    0.38  0.40  0.80  0.82  0.82  0.82 
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Table 2: Robustness checks, alternative measures of governance reform 






















Notes: Cells report only the parameter estimates for the alternative reform variables. The full MRA results are 
available from the authors. See Table 1, column 7 for the full specification of the model. Figures in brackets 
report the absolute value of the t-statistic, using cluster robust standard errors. All estimates are with weighted 
least squares, with precision used as weights. Bold coefficients are statistical significant at the 5% level. %Non-
Exec  is the average proportion of board members who are non-executives.  %Separation  is the average 
proportion of boards that separate Chair and CEO.  %Compliance is percentage of firms that fully comply with 
the  Combined Code.  %PostCad  is the percentage of observations from the post Cadbury Report  era. 
%CombinedCode is the percentage of observations from the post Combined Code era. N is number of studies 
and K is the number of estimates. 
Measure of reform  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cadbury  0.037 
(2.43)  -  -  0.032 
(2.05)  -  - 
% Non-Exec  -  -0.695 
(1.32)  -  -  -  - 
% Separation  -  -  0.064 
(0.34)  -  -  - 
% Compliance  -  -  -  -0.126 
(1.29)  -  - 
% PostCad  -  -  -  -  0.061 
(1.81)  - 
% Post CombinedCode  -  -  -  -  -0.028 
(0.57)  - 
EcoFree  -  -  -  -  -  0.070 
(2.09) 
N (K)  44 (511)  44 (505)  41 (469)  44 (511)  44 (511)  44 (511) 
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1  Benito and Conyon (1999)  +0.04*  24  Girma, Thompson and 
Wright (2006) 
+0.02* 
2  Bruce, Skovoroda, 
Fattorusso and Buck (2007) 
+0.21*  25  Gregg, Machin and 
Szymanski (1993) 
+0.05* 
3  Buck, Bruce, Main and 
Udueni (2003) 
+0.09*  26  Guest (2009)  +0.09* 
4  Coakley and Iliopoulou 
(2006) 
+0.29*  27  Haynes, Thompson 
and Wright (2007) 
+0.18* 
5  Conyon (1995)  -0.01  28  Ingham and Thompson 
(1993) 
-001 
6  Conyon (1997)  +0.07*  29  Ingham and Thompson 
(1995) 
-0.02 
7  Conyon (1998)  +0.01  30  Johnston (2002)  +0.25* 
8  Conyon and Gregg (1994)  +0.05  31  Johnston (2005)  +0.27* 
9  Conyon and Leech (1994)  +0.04  32  McKnight (1996)  +0.10 
10  Conyon and Murphy (2000)  +0.01  33  McKnight and 
Tomkins (1999) 
+0.13 
11  Conyon and Nicolitsas 
(1998) 
+0.08  34  McKnight, Tomkins, 
Weir and Hobson 
(2000) 
+0.36* 
12  Conyon and Peck (1998)  +0.08  35  Main (1991)  +0.13* 
13  Conyon and Schwalbach 
(2000) 
+0.04*  36  Main, Bruce and Buck 
(1996) 
+0.11*  
14  Cosh (1975)  +0.22*  37  Main and Johnston 
(1993) 
+0.07 
15  Cosh and Hughes (1997)  +0.07  38  Meeks and 
Whittington (1975) 
+0.16* 
16  Cragg and Dyck (2000)  +0.04  39  Ogden and Watson 
(2004) 
+0.16* 
17  Cubbin and Hall (1983)  +0.25*  40  Ogden and Watson 
(2007) 
+0.27* 
18  Dong and Ozkan (2007)  +0.06  41  Ozkan (2007)  +0.05 
19  Eicholz et al. (2008)  +0.10  42  Smith and Szymanski 
(1995) 
+0.03 
20  Ezzamel and Watson (1998)  +0.06  43  Watson (1994)  +0.17 
21  Ezzamel and Watson (2002)  +0.06  44  Watson and Wilson 
(2005) 
+0.39* 
22  Fattorusso, Skovoroda, 
Buck and Bruce (2007) 
+0.09*       
23  Girma, Thompson and 
Wright (2002) 
+0.08       
Notes: # this is the average of all estimates used in the MRA. Partial correlations calculated directly from the 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we focus exclusively on the remuneration of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the Board of 
Directors. However, much of the analysis applies also to other senior personnel. 
2  Corporate scandals and failures create negative perceptions about governance that spillover to other 
corporations. This negative spillover might require corrective collective action.   
3 The Cadbury Report (1992) influenced the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 1999). UK’s 
comply or explain process has been adopted by many countries as an international benchmark. 
4 In one sense, the UK has a mixture of voluntary codes and mandatory rules. Indeed, the Cadbury Report itself 
warned that legislation will follow if the code of best practice was not adopted. However, Bruce, Buck and Main 
(2005) argue that the legislative changes are best viewed as lending credibility to self-regulation rather than 
being an additional source of intervention.  
5 The revised Combined Code will apply from June 2010 and is to be renamed “The UK Corporate Governance 
Code” (FRC, 2009a).  
6 The one notable meta-analysis on the pay-performance association is by Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia 
(2000), who analyze the results from 29 US studies published between 1962 and 1998 and find a weak pay-
performance association. 
7  While some researchers have used corporate data arising from greater disclosure to test the effects of 
governance variables on pay, most do not directly test the effects of reform. 
8 Reviews of this literature include Conyon, Gregg and Machin (1995), Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), 
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), Murphy (1999), and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003).  
9 This is a reduced-form linear model that is only broadly consistent with principal-agent models. The estimation 
of structural parameters is rare, partly because the theoretical models do not provide clear guidance on exact 
specification or identification. 
10 Unobservable company specific factors also play a role and are sometimes included in the modeling strategy. 
11 Other reports in the sequence include the Rutteman Report (1994), the Turnbull Report (1999), the Myners 
Report (2001), the Higgs Report (2003), the Smith Report (2003), and the Tyson Report (2003). In addition to 
these reports, there have been numerous initiatives on remuneration instigated by various professional bodies.  
12 The process of corporate governance reform was sanctioned by the UK government and initiated by various 
institutions, most notably: the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, the Confederation of 
British Industry, the National Association of Pension Funds, the Association of British Insurers, and the 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies. 
13 In the analysis below we also include factors that were not and could not be considered by the original 
research studies: trends in pay for performance, the degree of market liberalisation, and governance reform. 
14 That is, the MRA estimate of β0 is the partial correlation equivalent of βy from equation 1, averaged over 
comparable estimates from multiple studies and conditional on the moderator variables, Z.   
15  0 0 < β , is consistent with cronyism (see Brick et al. 2006). 
16 The search for studies was ended in March 2009. Our meta-regression analysis does not include studies 
published after December 2008.  
17 Because we are focusing on only the UK pay-performance link, this English requirement does not reduce the 
number of relevant estimates.   
18 We have also excluded from the meta-dataset any estimate that related only to unlisted companies.  
19 The full reference list can be downloaded from the authors.  
20 Studies use different levels of scaling and different transformations, making regression coefficients difficult to 
compare directly. 
21 On the use of partial correlations for MRA, see Doucouliagos (1995) and Djankov and Murrell (2002). Partial 
correlations can be calculated from reported t-statistics. Where t-statistics were not reported in a study, we can 
derive them from the reported p-values. 
22 Researchers typically use Cohen’s (1988) categories to denote the strength of an association, with less than 
0.1 being trivial and between 0.1 and 0.3 being a small effect. A correlation needs to be at least 0.10 before it is 
considered to be ‘small’ (Cohen, 1988).  
23 An alternative weight is to use the Impact Factor of the journal in which the study was published (as reported 
in the Social Science Citation Index, SSCI, 2007). These can be considered to be measures of what the 
profession deems to be more important. We prefer the more traditional approach in meta-analysis, which is to 
use the estimate’s precision as this is more objective and is based on the underlying statistical properties of the 
reported estimates (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). Interestingly, we find no association between the precision of 
the reported estimates and the Impact Factors. Regressing precision on a constant and the journal’s Impact 
Factor produces a coefficient (and t-statistic) on the Impact Factor of -0.92 (-0.47). That is, journals with larger 
Impact Factors do not appear to report more precise estimates.  We also add Impact Factor to the below     37 
                                                                                                                                                        
MRA models, but it is never statistically significant.  That is, the size of the reported pay-performance effect is 
not related to the Impact Factor of the journal in which the study was published. 
24  We use  the studies themselves as the clustering variable. Treating authors as the clustering dimension 
produces similar results.   
25 The conventional test for publication bias is the Egger test (Egger et al., 1997) or the funnel-asymmetry test 
(Stanley, 2008), which regresses an estimate on its standard error, SE.  The coefficient on SE from this MRA 
represents publication bias or asymmetry of the funnel graph. This test is known to have low power (Stanley, 
2008).  Including this term for publication selection in our MRAs, below, does not affect any of our findings; 
thus, all these results are robust to the potential presence of publication selection.    
26 These weights can be shown to be optimal (Cooper and Hedges, 1994).   
27  When a statistical package is used, the weights need to be specified as precision squared, or 1/SE
2.  
Alternatively, WLS may be accomplished by multiplying the entire MRA equation (2) by precision, 1/SE. 
28 Below we also consider alternative measures of reform. 
29 http://www.freetheworld.com/index.html. The index is constructed by considering factors such as the size of 
government, the top marginal income tax rate, judicial independence, protection of property rights, legal 
enforcement of contracts, the mean tariff rate, regulatory trade barriers, capital controls, interest rate controls, 
and hiring and firing regulations, among others. 
30 Other corporate governance aspects are occasionally explored in this literature, but these are the aspects that 
have received the most attention. 
31 A Wald test confirms the redundancy of the omitted variables: 1.43 with a p-value of 0.169. 
32 Empire building models predict that managers will exploit weak corporate governance and increase the size of 
the firm (Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1964). However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003, p. 1047) show that 
instead of building empires, managers might “prefer to avoid the difficult decisions and costly efforts” and 
instead opt to “enjoy the quiet life”. 
33 While the average correlation for the 511 pay-performance partial correlations is +0.08, the corresponding 
average pay-size correlation is almost double, +0.14. However, the two 95% confidence intervals do overlap: 
+0.06 to +0.10 for pay and performance and +0.05 to +0.24 for pay and size. 
34 This variable is constructed by collecting estimates of board composition reported by: Cosh and Hughes 
(1987 and 1997), Conyon (1994 and 1998), Ezzamel & Watson (1998), Dahya et al (2002), Ogden and Watson 
(2004), Rayton and Cheng (2004), and Ozhan (2007a and 2007b). The number of firms in these samples are 
used as weights. 
35 The studies used to construct % Separation are: Cosh and Hughes (1987), Main & Johnson (1993), Conyon 
(1994), Conyon and Peck (1998), Benito and Conyon (1999), Dahya and Travlos (2000), Fattorusso et al. 
(2007), Ogden and Watson (2004) and Rayton and Cheng (2004). The number of firms in these samples are 
used as weights. 
36 This data is taken from Bruno and Faur-Grimaudy (2009). 
37 In unreported regressions, we re-estimated column 7 of Table 1 after instrumenting EcoFree with the value of 
economic freedom in the prior decade, as well as with the value of economic freedom in key Western European 
nations.  As a further test, we re-estimated column 7 separately for the pre- and post-Cadbury period. Cadbury 
retains its statistical significance in all these specifications. 
 
38 Firms might prefer to use accounting measures if these are less noisy signals than market based ones (Sloan 
1993). Rogerson (1997) argues that under certain conditions, tying compensation to accounting measures might 
induce optimal investment decisions to be made. 
39 ROE also has a positive coefficient. Like ROA, ROE is an accounting measure. The coefficient here reflects 
something specific about the few estimates that use this measure (mean is 0.014), hence, we do not place much 
attention on this result.  
40 Some studies use sales to measure both performance and firm size. Where the sterling value of sales is used, 
we treat the variable as a measure of firm size. Where sales growth is used or profit/sales, we use it as a 
performance measure. 
41 78% of estimates that use lagged pay also control for firm fixed effects, 95% use panel data, and 74% do not 
use OLS. 
42 Note that the correlation between Panel and Lagpay is only 0.34. While 56% of estimates use panel data, only 
16% controlled for lagged pay. 
43 Conyon (1997) also finds that governance innovations do not affect the pay for performance link. A full meta-
analysis of the effects of governance on pay is outside the scope of this paper. 
44 Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) is a notable exception. 
45 Regressing the partial correlation on the natural logarithm of assets gives a coefficient of -0.019, with a t-
statistic of -2.19. Using the natural logarithm of sales gives a coefficient of 0.001, with a t-statistic of 0.75.  